Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/04/2018

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December 25, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 24 Zoning Bulletin sional office space. However, that owner stopped using the Property for com- mercial purposes in 2011, and the original CUP had then expired. In October 2013, LeBlanc applied to the City for a CUP authorizing use of the Property as a professional office space. The City's Planning Commission approved the CUP. Notably, in approving the CUP, the Planning Commission determined that, based on the square footage of the professional office space, a minimum of three parking spaces for the use were required. It was determined that those three spaces would be provided in a tandem configuration, with one parking space provided in a garage and two spaces in the driveway. Michael Harrington ("Harrington") lived next door to the Property. Har- rington appealed the City's grant of the CUP to LeBlanc. Harrington argued that the City erred in approving the CUP because the professional office use was "not of the same general character as the other conditional and general permitted uses within R-3-M." Harrington also argued that the parking plan for the Property and the professional office use did "not conform to law." Ultimately, the City Council upheld the Planning Commission's approval of the CUP. Several months later, upon LeBlanc's inquiry, the City notified LeBlanc that an accessible parking space was not required at the Property. Harrington again appealed, arguing that an accessible parking space was required. The City Council denied Harrington's appeal, concluding that an accessible park- ing space was not required on the Property. Harrington then filed a legal action in court. The superior court denied Har- rington's petition, and he again appealed. On appeal, Harrington argued that the City erred in granting the CUP to LeBlanc because the CUP violated the City's Municipal Code. Harrington contended that: (1) the CUP required LeBlanc to provide accessible parking spaces; (2) the issuance of the CUP effectuated a change in occupancy that triggered the accessible parking requirements for new construction under the City's Building Code; (3) the CUP contemplated alterations to the Property that triggered the Building Code's accessible parking requirements; (4) the City Council failed to make sufficient findings to support the conclusion that compliance with accessible parking requirements would be technically infeasible; and (5) the CUP conflicted with the City's Municipal Code because the Municipal Code required protection of the "residential character" of an R-3 district. DECISION: Judgment of superior court affirmed. The Court of Appeal, Third District, California, rejected all of Harrington's claims. The court first concluded that, contrary to Harrington's claims, the CUP did not require LeBlanc to provide an accessible parking space since provision of an accessible parking space was not a condition of approval for the CUP. Second, the court concluded that the expiration of the previous CUP on the Property changed the permitted use of the Property under the zoning code, but did not, as Harrington had argued, change the occupancy classification under the Building Code. Under the Building Code, there was no change in oc- cupancy classification of a building unless the building official issued a certif- 10 © 2017 Thomson Reuters