Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/05/2018

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February 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 3 Zoning Bulletin offer short-term rentals on her property. She brought a claim against the County under federal statute (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), contending that Regulation 15.35 violated her "grandfathered constitutional rights." She also challenged the County's denial of her applications for rezoning or amendment and her request for a declaration of rights. Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on May's request for a declaration that she had a grandfathered right to rent her property. The district court found that issue had already been litigated and decided in May's August 2011 criminal citation case. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over May's claims related to the County's denial of her ap- plication for rezoning and amendment and her request for a declaration (leaving those only to be challenged in state court). Finally, as to May's § 1983 claims that the County's Regulation 15.35 violated her "grandfa- thered constitutional rights," the district court determined that the Rooker - Feldman doctrine barred its review of May's § 1983 claims. The Rooker -Feldman doctrine provides that federal district courts and courts of appeal do not have jurisdiction to review state court decisions. The doctrine "applies both to federal claims raised in the state court and to those `inextricably intertwined' with the state court's judgment." It applies as long as the party bringing the claims had a "reasonable opportunity" to raise the federal claims in state proceedings.' May appealed. She argued that the Rooker -Feldman doctrine did not apply here because her state court case was an "as applied" challenge to Regulation 15.35, while the federal challenge she was making differed in that in federal court she was now claiming that the enactment of Regula- tion 15.35 could not limit her "constitutional grandfathered right." DECISION: Judgment of District Court for the Middle District of Georgia affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, held that the Rooker -Feldman doctrine barred May's § 1983 claim and her declaratory judgment request "because the crux of [her claim] was addressed in the first [state] civil case." The court noted that "[e]ven if her § 1983 claim that she ha[d] a `vested constitutional right to continue renting [her prop- erty] on a short-term basis,' [was] somehow distinct from an as applied challenge to the constitutionality of the Regulation 15.35 bar against her enjoyment of that right, that claim [was] inextricably intertwined with her claims from her first civil case. And so [was] her request for a declaratory judgment." The court explained that both her § 1983 claim and her claim for declaratory relief were "based on her assertion that she ha[d] a `grandfathered right' to rent her property on a short[ -]term basis." Thus, both claims would require finding that her claim of a "vested constitutional right" was not time barred under Georgia law for her failure to challenge Regulation 15.35 within 30 days of its passage. In other words, it would require a finding in federal district court "on the same claims that she 4 © 2018 Thomson Reuters