My WebLink
|
Help
|
About
|
Sign Out
Home
Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/05/2018
Ramsey
>
Public
>
Agendas
>
Planning Commission
>
2018
>
Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/05/2018
Metadata
Thumbnails
Annotations
Entry Properties
Last modified
3/21/2025 10:30:48 AM
Creation date
4/2/2018 9:35:16 AM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
Meetings
Meeting Document Type
Agenda
Meeting Type
Planning Commission
Document Date
04/05/2018
Jump to thumbnail
< previous set
next set >
There are no annotations on this page.
Document management portal powered by Laserfiche WebLink 9 © 1998-2015
Laserfiche.
All rights reserved.
/
691
PDF
Print
Pages to print
Enter page numbers and/or page ranges separated by commas. For example, 1,3,5-12.
After downloading, print the document using a PDF reader (e.g. Adobe Reader).
View images
View plain text
Zoning Bulletin February 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 3 <br />brought, and lost, in state court." "So she [was] complaining of the same <br />injury in both cases, and [was] implicitly seeking a rejection of the state <br />court's judgment that [Georgia Code § 5-3-20(a)] barred her request for <br />relief." Thus, although not "bill[ed]" as an "appeal of the state court judg- <br />ment," her federal court claims were "in substance just that," found the _ <br />court. The court concluded that Rooker -Feldman therefore barred federal <br />review of May's claims because all of her claims here were "inextricably <br />intertwined" with those from the first state civil case. <br />See also: District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. <br />462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983). <br />See also: Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 E3d 1266, 89 U.S.P..Q.2d 1911 (11 th <br />Cir. 2009). <br />See also: Casale v. Tillman, 558 E3d 1258 (11 th Cir. 2009). <br />Case Note: <br />May had alternatively argued that the court should adopt an exception to Rooker - <br />Feldman, and find that it did not apply because the state court in the first civil <br />case lacked subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., the authority to hear the specific <br />subject matter of May's case). The court concluded that even if it were to adopt <br />such an exception, it would not apply here because the court in May's first civil <br />case had subject matter jurisdiction to determine that the 30-day state law time <br />bar (Georgia Code § 5-3-20(a)) applied to May's claims. <br />Use/Interpretation of Zoning <br />Regulations —County Planning <br />Director authorizes mining <br />operation under construction <br />permit <br />County Board reverses, maintaining that a mining <br />permit is instead required <br />Citation: Croell Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Pennington County Board of Commis- <br />sioners, 2017 SD 87, 2017 WL 6381344 (S.D. 2017) <br />SOUTH DAKOTA (12/13/17)—This case addressed the issue of <br />whether, under a county ordinance, a mining operation was properly <br />permitted under a construction permit. The case also addressed the issue of <br />whether the mining operation was exempt from permit requirements as a <br />legal nonconforming use. <br />© 2018 Thomson Reuters 5 <br />
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.