Agenda - Council - 02/08/2005 - Laserfiche WebLink

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(tv[inn. 1994). [n this case, tl-r,e, coUrt reasoned that the county had considered "safety issues, financial burdens, and the possible regal consequences of voluntarily placing signs at -areas outside 'recognized right-of-ways" and was tharefore entitled to discretionary immunity. [d_.~ at 176. The court did note, however, that "[d]~scretionary immuniw protects thegovernment only when it can produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than:merely, professional or scientific .]udgmenj:s." Id--=' (citing Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 1422 'N.W.2d'713, 722 (Minn. 1988). Since then, the courts have again:reviSited the issue. [n Ireland v. Crow's Nest Yachts. [nc.. 273 N.W.2d 269, ,_7o (Mitre. Ct~ App, 1996), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 1996), the court of appeals evaluated a claim that offi. tcial immun/ty should protect a county, 'traffic engineer accused of negligen, ce in placing advisOry:speed plate on a county' highway. The court concluded that the ~VLMUTCD left such a decision to the engineer's professional .judgment, and that the decision was therefore entitled to official, immunity. Id.._~. at 274.' The court also found that the county was entitled to vicarious official immunity,, because holding the county (the engineer's employer) liable would result [n an indirect impact on the engineer's ability 'to independently exercise professional judgment. Id_.__~ That same year, the supreme court Considered the case of whether the city 0f St. Paul could be held liable ~br injUries allegedlY arising out: Of the riming of an all red clearance interval.~ Zank v. Larson. 552 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. i996)i The court applied the familiar test for, discretionary' immu. nity; whether the decision regarding the clearance timing involved po[icy-making judgments. rd__~, at 721. Here, the court accepted that the MN~UTCD gave individual engineers discretion to set the timing of the clearance intervals, based on the competing safety, considerations of longer clearance intervals versus shorter ones: Id_..~. at 722. When coupled with the fact that the city had also 'weighed the effect on traffic fidTM of clearance interval times, the court had little trouble in finding that the decision was entitled to discretionary .immunity. [d____~ Each of these cases makes reference to a host Of other cases involving tr~.ffic engineering decisions. Taken as a who:lc, there is. lit-tie or no internal consistency as to when a traffic engineering decision is entitled t© discretionary, immunity. The best that can be said is that the trend seems to be to grant discretionary :immunity for these types of decisions, particularly if the b,,LMUTCD leaves the particular decision to the engineer's discretion. W'ith respect to stop signs, rJie MhVfft_/TCD sets out certain conditions in which they "may be warranted." I have attached a copy ofthe portion'of the MM-UTCD discussing these conditions. Other provisions regarding stop signs are mandatory,, such as the fact that they should generally be located on the fight side of the road. Because no exercise of discretion is involved with these, it would not be possible to claim immunity for them. My understanding, however, is that the city, is merely concerned with warrants, and not with these latter types of issues. t :xm all red clearance inrervat is the period in which ':ali lights at an intersection simultaneously indicate red. and is designed t© allow the intersection to clear bel:bre previously