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With respect to stop sign warrants, then, ~t Would seem that the ci~ stands a good chance of <br />cloaking its decisions with disc'r'~tionarY immUnity. Because of the lack of judicial consistency, <br />however, and the risk of faC!ng a bad set: of facts (such as a Schoolchild killed on a street about <br />which the dity had received comPlaints), no guarantees can be-provi6ed that.the city, has complete <br />protection. ' .... <br /> <br /> Standard ~f Care: <br /> <br />To the extent, that stop sign placement may not be entitled to discretionary.irnmuni~, is is easier <br />to discern the standard of cure'to which a traffic engineer would be heM. Engineers must <br />"exercise such care, skill: and diligence as .men in that profession ordinarily exercise under like <br />circumstance, s." Ciw of Eveleth v. Ruble, 225 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn. 1974). This would <br />presumably be the standard °f care to which a city's traffic engineer wou(d be held.: <br /> <br /> 2 In some cases, a decision regarding stop sign placement that flies in the face of a <br />NtNFU-TCD mandate could be negligence per se. "[V]iolations of regutations or ordinances that <br />axe adopted pursuant to sratUto~ authority can result in negligence per se . . . if the persons <br />harmed by chat violation are within the intended protection of the statute and the harm suffered <br />is o/'the ~.pe the legislation was intended to prevent." ;Alderman's [nc. v. Shanks. 536 N.W.2d <br /> N.W.~d 548. <br />4. 7-8.(Minn 1995).(quoting Pa&ftc Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-¥ae~er. [nc.. 260 ' '" <br />558-59 (Minn. [977) (emphasis in original).. For example, certain violations of the Uniform Fire <br />Code 3re negligence per se. Again assuming that the city. is not concerned with mandator~ <br />MML:TCD provisions, but only advisory, or permissive ones, this should not be an issue. <br /> <br />3~'G~_22408 <br />,*F~12 ~ - 24 <br /> <br /> <br />