Agenda - Planning Commission - 12/06/2018

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October 25, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 20 Zoning Bulletin If the religious institution can establish such a "substantial burden," then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant government to then prove that its zoning decision served a compelling governmental interest and that it represented the least restrictive means to achieve that interest, explained the court. To prove a compelling interest, "the governmental entity must show that when it made its decision, it possessed evidence —and not mere speculation —that plaintiffs' action would harm the interest cited by the government," said the court. Moreover, "[w]hen the governmental entity defends its decision by claiming that it represented the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling purpose, it must show that any alternatives suggested by plaintiffs are ineffective to achieve its goals." With those legal standards in mind, the court then turned to the facts of the case at hand. The court found that both the Church and the City failed to carry their summary judgment burden. The court did conclude that a reasonable jury could find the City violated RLUIPA's substantial burden provision because the City had failed to show that alternatives to the denial of the meeting house were inadequate to address the interests of noise and traffic. Looking next at the RLUIPA equal terms claim, the court again found that summary judgment was not warranted because determining "[w]hether two entities are similarly situated under RLUIPA is a fact -specific question that the jury normally should decide." Still, again, the court offered guidance: The Church could show two projects were similarly situated for equal terms comparison if, although not identical, they had "many substantial similarities" such as similarly sized expansions in the same zoning district. In contrast, the City could show that two projects were dis- similar by showing that different zoning criteria applied —such as a differ- ent decision maker (i.e., historic building board versus zoning board), a different applicable law at the time of application, or the exemption of one of the comparators from local zoning requirements. The court then turned to the Church's third RLUIPA claim, which as- serted a violation of RLUIPA's unreasonable limits provision. The court explained that under that provision, RLUIPA barred laws that completely exclude or unreasonably limit all religious assemblies. To succeed on such a claim here, explained the court, the Church would have to establish not only that the Church's religious assembly was limited but that the City had "completely excluded all religious assembly or imposed limitations that effectively bar[red] all religious activity." Here, the court found that the Church had failed to establish that the City placed unreasonable limits on all religious practices within its boundaries. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on this claim. The next claim analyzed by the court was the Church's claim that the City violated the Church's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The court explained that while the First Amendment prohibits government bans on religion, it does allow for "laws that regulate religious practices in some circumstances." Generally, said the court, "under the 10 © 2018 Thomson Reuters