Agenda - Planning Commission - 12/06/2018

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Zoning Bulletin October 25, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 20 First Amendment, laws that are not discriminatory on their face and evenly applied are permissible so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Here, the Church had contended that the City had not applied its zoning ordinances evenly to religious and secular institutions. The court explained that there is a five -factor test for determin- ing whether a government has applied a neutral law (like a zoning ordinance) discriminatorily: "(1) Whether defendant passed its zoning or- dinances because of religious animus"; "(2) Whether defendant has targeted religious groups specifically in its enforcement of the law"; "(3) Whether defendant has treated similarly situated secular institutions more favorably than plaintiffs"; "(4) Whether the zoning ordinance's exceptions are based on broad, objectively defined criteria or, instead, on subjective considerations"; "(5) Whether the law places a substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise." Looking at the summary judgment record, the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude in the Church's favor on the final three of the five factors —thus favoring a finding that the City enforced its facially neutral law discriminatorily. The court also concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the City had failed to meet its burden to justify its actions under the strict scrutiny standard —requiring the City show its decision to deny use of the meeting house served a compelling governmental interest that was the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. The court thus denied the City's motion for summary judgment. (The Church did not bring a motion for summary judgment on this cause of action). Next, the court addressed the Church's claim that the City's action violated § 7 of the Kansas Constitution's Bill of Rights. That section prohibits infringement of the "right to worship God." Relying on its conclusion that a reasonable jury could find that the City failed to meet its burden to justify its actions because it had failed to show that alternatives to the denial of the meeting house were inadequate to address the interests of noise and traffic —the court also denied the City's summary judgment motion as to this claim. Finally, for the same reasons it denied the City's motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA substantial burden provision, the court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on the Church's Kansas Preser- vation of Religious Freedom Act claim. (Like RLUIPA, that Act also prohibits a governmental entity from substantially burdening a person's right to exercise religions unless the government proves that its action furthers a compelling governmental interest that is the least restrictive way to accomplish that interest.) See also: Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 E3d 338, 226 Ed. Law Rep. 595 (2d Cir: 2007). See also: Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery County Council, 706 E3d 548 (4th Cir. 2013). ©2018 Thomson Reuters 11