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December 25, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 24 Zoning Bulletin tanding®In judicial action, special use permit applicant contends that group challenging its permit lacked standing Challengers argue applicant waived that standing argument by not raising it at administrative level Citation: York v. Athens College of Ministry, Inc., 2018 WL 5729088 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) GEORGIA (11/02/18)—This case addressed the issue of whether the grant of a special use permit was a legislative or quasi-judicial action —thus impacting when a challenge to a party's standing must first be made —at the administrative or judicial level. The Background/Facts: Athens College of Ministry, Inc. ("ACM") sought to build a college campus in Oconee County (the "County"). In furtherance of the proposed development, ACM applied to the County Board of Commission- ers (the "Board") for a special use permit. Property owners in the area —Kevin York and Icy Forest, LLC (collectively, the "Objectors") —sent a letter to the Board, objecting to ACM's special use permit application. Eventually, follow- ing a public hearing, the Board granted ACM the special use permit, subject to specific conditions. The Objectors then filed in the County Superior Court a petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the grant of the special use permit. ACM and the County moved to dismiss the Objectors' petition. They argued that the Objectors lacked the required legal standing to challenge the Board's decision. Specifically, they argued that the Objectors had failed to show that they would be damaged in a way that was uncommon to similarly situated property owners. The Objectors argued that ACM and the County could not now challenge the Objectors' standing because they waived that challenge by failing to raise the issue of standing before the Board. Specifically, they contended that the deci- sion to grant the special use permit to ACM was quasi judicial, and, therefore, ACM and the County were required to raise any standing issue before the Board. The Objectors argued that the failure to raise the standing issue before the Board resulted in a waiver of any standing challenge since the trial court's review was limited to the arguments raised before the Board. ACM and the County countered, arguing that the Board's decision to issue the special use permit was legislative. As such, they maintained that the trial court could therefore review the issue of standing in the first instance. The trial court agreed with ACM and the County, concluding that the Board's issuance of the special use permit was legislative and that therefore the standing issue could be raised in the first instance before the trial court. The trial court then ruled that the Objectors lacked standing to challenge the Board's decision because they failed to show special damage or injury. The Objectors appealed. On appeal, they argued that the trial court erred in addressing the standing issue and dismissing their petition. 10 © 2018 Thomson Reuters