Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/07/2019

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Zoning Bulletin December 25, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 24 DECISION: Judgment of superior court reversed. Agreeing with the Objectors, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the decision by the Board to issue the special use permit was quasi-judicial, not legislative, and, thus that the County and ACM had waived their challenge to the Objectors' standing by not raising the issue of standing before the Board. In so holding, the court explained that "[w]hen a party seeks certiorari review in the trial court of a decision of an administrative body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the trial court is bound by the facts and evidence presented to the administrative body, and the issue of standing is waived if it was not raised before the administrative body." On the other hand, explained the court, when a party seeks review of a local government's legislative decision, the trial court may hear newly introduced evidence, including with regard to the question of standing. In determining whether the Board's decision to issue the special use permit to ACM was quasi-judicial or legislative, the court detailed the following test: Generally, [a quasi-judicial] decision operates to address a specific dispute or determine rights and obligations of a particular party or parties. The resulting deci- sion seeks to establish those rights and obligations or otherwise resolve the dispute, and is immediate in application. A legislative decision, on the other hand, is usually marked by a general inquiry, often not limited to the facts and circumstances of specific people or properties, which results in a rule of law or course of policy that will apply in the future. The court noted that the decision making process "for applying preexisting standards to individual circumstances" —such as where a special permit is sought under terms set out in the local ordinance —is adjudicatory with the governing body (i.e., here, the Board) acting in "a quasi-judicial capacity to determine the facts and apply the law." Here, the court found that the Board, in assessing ACM's special use permit application, analyzed the application against 10 objective "standards for special use consideration" set forth in the County ordinance. The court concluded that this process used for the Board's decision —involving the determination of facts and application of the facts to the ordinance's legal standards —was a decision - making process aldn to a judicial act. Thus, the court concluded that the Board's determination to grant the special use permit was quasi-judicial. Accordingly, the court also concluded that ACM and the County waived their challenge to the Objectors' standing since they failed to raise the issue before the Board. See also: Druid Hills Civic Ass 'n, Inc. v. Buckler; 328 Ga. App. 485, 760 S.E.2d 194 (2014) (disapproved of by, Hourin v. State, 301 Ga. 835, 804 S.E.2d 388 (2017)). See also: City of Cumming v. Flowers, 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846 (2017). Case Note: The trial court, in deciding that the Board's decision was legislative, had interpreted Georgia statutory law—OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) as governing this dispute. That statute defines a "zoning decision" as a "final legislative action by a local government," includ- ing "[t]he grant of a permit relating to a special use of property." But the appellate court disagreed with this interpretation, noting that the statute defined a "zoning deci- sion," not a "special use permit" or "special use approval" decision. In other words, © 2018 Thomson Reuters 11