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10/29/2020 State v. Castellano :: 1993 :: Minnesota Court of Appeals Decisions :: Minnesota Case Law :: Minnesota Law :: US Law :: Justia
<br />Carey, 447 U.S. at 471, 10o S. Ct. at 2295-96. Because the home is "the last citadel of the
<br />tired, the weary and the sick," Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125, 89 S. Ct. 946,
<br />954, 22 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1969) (Black, J., concurring), and is "one retreat to which men and
<br />women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits," Carey, 447 U.S. at
<br />471,10o S. Ct. at 2295, the government may legislate to protect intrusion into the privacy of
<br />the home of unwilling listeners. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484, 108 S. Ct. at 2502. The Town of
<br />White Bear, in stating its substantial interest "in the protection of residential privacy
<br />and [in] protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home which is * * * of the
<br />highest order in a free and civilized society," see Town of White Bear, Minn., Ordinance No.
<br />63, § 2, parallels language of the Court in Carey, 447 U.S. at 471, 100 S. Ct. at 2296 (the
<br />"State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
<br />certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society"). Thus, the language of the
<br />White Bear Ordinance meets fully the requirement that a valid government interest be
<br />served by the regulation of expression.
<br />C. Narrow in Scope
<br />In arguing that Ordinance No. 63 unconstitutionally sweeps too broadly, appellant
<br />essentially claims that the ordinance is not narrow in scope. He raises two concerns: (1) the
<br />ordinance, in using the word "activity" in describing targeted residential picketing, *647
<br />includes within the sweep of regulation activity that is dearly protected by the First
<br />Amendment; and (2) the ordinance, in prohibiting expression unless the dwelling's
<br />"occupant" consents, extends beyond the protection of the unwilling listener. We believe
<br />each of these challenges must fail.
<br />"A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of
<br />the ' evil' it seeks to remedy." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485, io8 S. Ct. at 2503 (citing Taxpayers
<br />for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808-81o, 104 S.Ct. at 2130-32). Even a complete ban can be
<br />narrowly tailored if each activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately
<br />targeted evil. Id.
<br />Frisby held that the Brookfield ordinance was narrowly tailored despite its complete ban on
<br />focused residential picketing. The "evil" of targeted residential picketing, the presence of an
<br />unwelcome visitor at the home, which the ordinance sought to eliminate was "created by
<br />the medium of expression itself." Id. at 487, 108 S. Ct. at 2504. Frisby noted that the
<br />Brookfield ordinance was narrowly directed at the household, not the public, and thus
<br />distinguished cases which had struck down complete bans of communication such as
<br />handbilling, solicitation, and marching, which communications were directed at broader
<br />residential areas.
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