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10/29/2020 State v. Castellano :: 1993 :: Minnesota Court of Appeals Decisions :: Minnesota Case Law :: Minnesota Law :: US Law :: Justia The type of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way. Id. at 486, io8 S. Ct. at 2503. The White Bear ordinance, like the Brookfield ordinance in Frisby, is "readily subject to a narrowing construction that avoids constitutional difficulties." See id. at 482, 108 S. Ct. at 2501. In construing the Brookfield ordinance, the Court stated: [T]he use of the singular form of the words "residence" and "dwelling" suggests that the ordinance is intended to prohibit only picketing focused on, and taking place in front of, a particular residence. * * * "Picketing," after all, is defined as posting at a particular place, a characterization in line with viewing the ordinance as limited to activity focused on a singular residence. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 17io (1981) to define picketing as "posting at a particular place"). Similarly, Ordinance No. 63 was not intended to circumscribe all "activity,"[2] but only activity constituting picketing in the focused sense. We interpret the White Bear ordinance in a limited fashion to proscribe only "picketing activity" focused on or taking place in front of a particular single residential dwelling. See id.[3] So narrowed, the ordinance would not prohibit constitutional distribution of materials to neighborhood residents, or solicitation by mail or in person. Appellant also argues that the White Bear ordinance is not tailored narrowly enough to protect only unwilling[4] listeners in *648 their homes, and that by extending protection to "occupants" rather than to "residents" the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad and vitiates any possibility of narrow construction. We disagree. We believe the word "occupant," as used in the ordinance, has a narrower definition than appellant urges,[5] and makes the White Bear ordinance no broader than the one held constitutional in Frisby. An "occupant" is a person "having possessory rights, who can control what goes on on premises." Black's Law Dictionary 1078 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary also defines "occupant" as "[o]ne who has actual use, possession or control of a thing." Id. Webster's defines "occupant" as one who takes possession of something that has no other owner and thereby acquires title by occupancy * * * one who takes possession under title, lease, or tenancy at will * * * one https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/court-of-appeals/1993/c4-93-356.html 7/12